This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of nonSOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking valuedestroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders. 
Introduction
Initial Public Offering (IPO)'s performance has important implications for public investors. IPO literature has clearly documented the phenomenon of pervasive long-run IPO underperformance. The literature (Ritter 1991; Loughran & Ritter 1995) shows that IPO stocks on a 3-5 year horizon underperforms the market or matching firms. Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that IPO firms experience a decline in their post-issue operating performance. Pagano et al. (1998) attribute the post-IPO fall in profitability to the window opportunity hypothesis when entrepreneurs want to take advantage of market timing.
In this paper, we examine whether the difference in ownership structure at firm level can explain IPO long-run (under) performance in China. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that large owners gain major control of the corporation and extract private benefits. Large shareholders often prefer disproportionate ownership structure in which their control rights are much greater than cash flow rights in emerging markets. Such disproportionate ownership structure becomes a major channel to facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Bae et al., 2012; Liu and Tian, 2012) . These empirical studies document a negative association between firm value/performance and disproportionate ownership structure in non-IPO contexts. Yeh et al. (2008) study IPO first-day return and disproportionate ownership structure in 2 Taiwan. Different from all these studies, we investigate IPO long-run performance in association with disproportionate ownership structure in China.
Post-IPO's secondary market is important place for most small and public investors to trade IPO firms. Many IPO underwriting process favors institutional investors so that small investor can only buy hot IPOs after they are traded. It is thus relevant to understand IPO long-run performance. On the other hand, IPO market offers an ideal place to investigate the causality between performance that is observed ex post and ownership structure ex ante. Most studies on ownership and performance are subject to endogeneity problem since they are jointly determined. We hypothesize that IPO firms with disproportionate ownership structure in the IPO day 1 will underperform other IPO firms in the long run due to the expropriation by controlling shareholders. We not only examine IPO's long-run stock performance using cross-sectional approaches, but also report the change of operating performance post-IPO. Furthermore, we try to understand the channels through which disproportionate ownership decrease long-run post-IPO performance.
We take advantage of Chinese IPO market for the following reasons. First, as other emerging markets, China's corporate governance system and investor protection are weak for small shareholders due to weak institutions. One implication is that the entrenchment effects of a disproportionate ownership structure are likely to be 1 Using the disproportionate ownership structure of the first day of IPO helps to eliminate the endogeneity issue because shares held by large controlling shareholders usually have a lock-up period of at least 36 months, which make the controlling shareholders are not able to change the disproportionate ownership structure during the long lock-up period. 3 pronounced in this market. Second, small retail investors actively investing in Chinese IPOs are naïve ones, which means IPO long-run performance is critical. Third, equity market provides a critical source of external financing for non-government owned firms, which comprise the majority of IPOs during the recent years. Most of firms in
China are characterized with a concentrated and disproportionate ownership structure.
Our findings therefore have general implications of ownership structure and IPO firm performance in countries with weak institutions.
We utilize a comprehensive sample of non-SOEs, and the sample includes 636 IPO companies listing between 2002 and 2010. SOEs are excluded in this research primarily because (1) SOEs in China have different objectives and principal-agent framework, compared to the non-SOEs, so the main agency issue in SOEs is agency conflict between the shareholders and managers rather than between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Rousseau and Xiao, 2007; Liu and Tian, 2012) ;
(2) Although SOEs may also have a disproportionate ownership structure, it was created mainly for the purpose of decentralization rather than to create an internal capital market , so disproportionate ownership structure in SOEs means that the controlling power of controlling shareholders has been largely decentralized to managers, which makes the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers stronger and controlling and minority shareholders less severe. We manually collect ownership information such as ultimate owners, controlling shareholders' cash flow and control rights. Disproportionate ownership is quite pervasive: 46% of our IPO 4 companies are characterized by excess control rights. We find that IPOs with excess control rights significantly underperform both the market and other comparable IPOs.
With three-year market, industry and size adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), IPOs with a control-ownership wedge underperform other IPOs by 32% and 16%, respectively. We also find IPOs with excess control rights show significant decline in operating performance post-IPO even after the pre-IPO earning management is controlled.
We further provide analysis to understand the channels through which disproportionate ownership leads to lower long-run performance. First, we rule out IPO mispricing 2 as a driver of underperformance for firms with excess control rights. We find that first day return is negatively associated with excess control rights. This suggests IPOs with disproportionate ownership have lower underpricing, partially excluding a possibility that overpricing leads to low long-run stock returns. We furthermore link firm performance and ownership structures to related party transactions. Recent studies suggest that when corporate wealth can be transferred from listed firms to their controlling shareholders, tunneling activities lead to poor performance (Peng et al., 2010) . We show that the frequency of value-destroying related party transactions is increasing in the presence and magnitude of excess control rights in IPO firms.
By examining the impact of disproportionate ownership structure on IPO long-run performance in Chinese capital market, this paper complements previous literature such as Smart and Zutter (2003) and Smart et al. (2008) who examine the value implication of control-ownership wedge in the IPO market of the US by documenting a strong entrenchment effect of excess control rights in newly listed firms in emerging markets. More importantly, it contributes to the literature on IPO long-term performance. We show that disproportionate ownership structure can explain IPO long-run underperformance. We show channels through which controlling shareholders expropriate minority ones by undertaking value-destroying related party transactions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces our data and sample.
Section 4 analyzes the impact of the divergence between the ultimate owner's cash flow and control rights on long-run performance. Section 5 addresses the effect of the ultimately controlling shareholders' excess control rights on the underpricing of non-state controlled IPOs, and section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature review
The very first investigation into the divergence between cash flow and control rights by La Porta et al., (1999) , which covers companies from 27 countries, suggests that controlling shareholders can gain control rights in excess of their cash flow claims through a pyramid structure and the common practice of ownership concentration. In 6 emerging markets, particularly, where concentrated ownership structure is widespread and the legal protection of minority shareholders is weak, agency costs are more like to originate from a conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Classens et al.,
, for example, identify a pyramid structure and cross shareholding as the major organizational strategy used by firms in nine East Asian economies to separate ownership and control. They also provide important evidence that entrenchment effects on corporate governance stemming from the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights can significantly decrease firm value (Classens et al, 2002) , a claim supported by several later studies (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Gompers et al., 2010) . Fan et al. (2011) show that the cost of expropriation is ultimately born by a controlling owner who must then devote substantial resources to mitigate the cost, while other researchers identify several channels through which large shareholders tunnel benefits. Cheung et al.'s (2006) analysis of related party transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders, for instance, associates these transactions with the wealth losses of minority shareholders. Likewise, Peng et al. (2010) provide evidence that in Chinese listed firms whose financial condition is sound, controlling shareholders use related party transactions to extract private benefits from minority shareholders.
In general, the literature on IPO performance documents two phenomena relevant for shareholders: pervasive short-run underpricing of IPOs across markets and time 7 periods and long-run IPO underperformance of the market in the long term, usually over three-or five-year periods (Ritter, 1991) . Jain and Kini (1994) , for example, find that new IPOs experience declines in operating performance post issuance. For China, Chan et al. (2004) document both underpricing and long-run underperformance, while Sun and Tong (2003) show that post-issue performance is negatively related to state ownership but positively related to legal-entity ownership. Wang (2005) also documents a sharp decline in post-IPO operating performance but argues that neither state ownership nor ownership concentration is related to performance. A negative relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and the initial return of IPOs is identified by Yeh et al. (2008) , but their study focuses on the Taiwanese market only.
All these studies, however, despite being focused on ownership's effect on IPO performance, fail to explore the implication of the first-order agency problems that arise from ownership concentration; that is, the conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. In the context of a disproportionate ownership economy, controlling shareholders are likely to have perverse incentives because of an excess of control rights. If the result is expropriation, it should be evident in IPOs. We therefore fill this research void by linking IPO performance to disproportionate ownership structure in newly listed firms.
The agency problem of disproportionate ownership structure results from conflicts of interest. In particular, through a pyramid ownership structure and cross-shareholding, controlling shareholders can exert control in excess of their cash flow rights, an 8 imbalance that also makes them less subject to board governance and market discipline.
Such entrenched controlling shareholders are more likely to pursue private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders or outside investors through such activities as related party transactions or connected party transactions in which corporate wealth can be expropriated through tunneling (Faccio et al., 2001 ). Fan and Wong (2002) show that in East Asian corporations, the earnings-return relation decreases with the level of controlling shareholders' excess control rights.
In the past three decades, China has undergone a profound institutional reform that has transformed its economic system from a central planning economy to a fairly decentralized market economy in which almost two-thirds of the nation's GDP is produced by the private sector (China Annuals of Statistics, 2009 We evaluate the post-IPO performance of the non-SOEs in our sample using both market-and accounting-based measures. Our market-based performance measures are the 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month post-IPO buy-and-hold stock returns (BHR) and the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR), both adjusted by the return of firms within the same market, industry, and size 4 . We calculate our results on the basis of monthly stock returns starting from the first month after the IPO date.
We compute the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHR) as follows:
where R it is the buy-and-hold return of stock i from month 1 to month t, and r it is the monthly raw return of the stock, and We also evaluate firm performance using accounting-based measures, which, however, raises the issue of all Chinese pre-IPO accounting data being subject to accounting manipulation to fulfill listing requirements (Aharony et al., 2000) . Such manipulation can create a downward bias in the accounting performance change measures, a bias that we take into account by weighting the results based on stock return measures more heavily than those based on accounting return measures. For our analysis, we adopt three industry-adjusted 5 accounting performance measures: sales growth, earnings growth, and the change in return on sales (ROS), calculated as the difference between the firm-specific and industry-median value of performance measure. We use ROS, calculated as net income divided by sales, rather than ROA or ROE because argue that measures based on equity or assets might create a downward bias on Chinese post-IPO firm performance. 6 Likewise, due to the fact that firms change significantly after IPO and the pre-IPO accounting performance and subject to manipulation, we use the average changes of the accounting 5 We employ the six-industry classifications borrowed from Firth et al. (2006) : finance, industrial, commercial, public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). 6 See for more details.
performance measures (sales growth, earnings growth and ROS) in the 3-year post-IPO period rather than the accounting performance changes before and after the IPO as proxy of post-IPO accounting performance change. It should be noted, however, that we have omitted the accounting numbers in the IPO year because these data tend to be heavily manipulated , and that the pre-IPO earning management is controlled in our regressions by including the pre-IPO earning management as a control variable.
Underpricing of IPO issues
We calculate the underpricing of an IPO issue as the return on the first day of trading (relative to the offering price):
where Ret i0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i, P i0 is the closing price of stock i on the first trading day, and P il is the offering price of stock i.
The market return on the first trading day of the new stock is
where Ret im is the market return on the first trading day of the new stock i, P i , m0 is the closing price of the appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index that corresponds to the offering day of the new stock i, and P i,ml is the closing price of the appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index on the first trading day of the new stock i .
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We adjust the return for the market effect as follows:
where AdjRet i0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i.
Disproportionate ownership structure, cash flow rights, and control rights
To examine the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure, we first identify the ultimate controlling shareholders by tracing the chain of ownership. Consistent with previous studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002) , we define control rights as the weakest link in the chain and cash flow rights as the product of ownership stakes along the chain. To illustrate, if an ultimately controlling shareholder owns 70% of the stock of publicly traded firm A, which in turn has 35% of the stock of firm B, then the ultimately controlling shareholder controls 35% of firm B, the weakest link in the control rights chain, and has cash flow rights of 24.5%, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. Because of a pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, and dual-class stocks, the largest shareholders' control rights are always in excess of its cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999) , and because controlling shareholders' control rights exceed their cash flow rights, they always have the incentive and opportunity to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999) .
Other control variables
Following previous studies, several control variables are also included in our study, detailed definition of all our variables used in this paper are reported in Appendix A. sectors (70.00% and 68.75%), followed by the industrial sector (45.68%), the public utilities sector (44.19%), and the conglomerate sector (38.27%). In terms of listed board, 48.33% of IPO firms listed in main board have disproportionate ownership structure, while the number is 50% and 31.25% in SME and GEM board.
Panel B reports firm characteristics at the time of the IPO. With a mean initial return of 79.30%, the average levels of underpricing are lower than those reported in earlier research (Mok and Hui, 1998; Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004) .
Nonetheless, the underpricing of IPOs in China is still much higher than that in 15 developed markets (Loughran et al., 1994) significantly in the three years subsequent to their IPOs in terms of both mean and median. As regards the accounting-based measures, the mean (median) change in the three-year average ROS of the sample is a negative -13.02% (-7.61%), reflecting a decline in Chinese IPO firms' accounting performance that is consistent with the data reported by Aharony et al. (2000) and Sun and Tong (2003) . Although the average post-IPO sales growth is positive (20.88%), the earnings growth lags far behind the sales growth (-28.90%), suggesting that the accounting performance of Chinese firms decrease in the post-IPO period.
[INSERT In this section, we investigate how the disproportionate ownership structure of non-state controlled IPO firms affects their long-term market-based performance and accounting-based performance. To examine the effects of disproportionate ownership structure on post-IPO performance, we perform regression analyses using generalized least squares to control for sample heterogeneity. Tables 3 and 4 summarize our regression results using the 12-, 24-, and 36-month BHRs and CARs as dependent variables. As the BHRs may not be normally distributed, to alleviate the potential influence of non-normal distribution of the long-term performance of IPOs, we transform the equal weighted matching firm-adjusted three-year BHR to the natural logarithm of 1000% plus each BHR. The regressions also include the ultimately controlling shareholders' cash flow rights (CASHFLOW), the degree of excess control (EXCESS), and a dummy (EXDUMMY) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights is larger than zero. The control variables are the log of total assets (SIZE), debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE), issuing P/E ratio (P/E) to control the rights is larger than zero. In addition to the control variables used in Table 3 and 4, we include one more variable (EM 8 ), which is the degree of earning management in the 3 year pre-IPO period, the results are reported separately in columns (2), (4) and (6). This is because pre-IPO firms in China tend to manipulate their earnings in the pre-IPO period (Chen et al., 2013) , which may also result in a decrease in post-IPO accounting performance. In other word, if we observe a worse post-IPO accounting performance in firms with excess control rights, it may be caused by those firms have more pre-IPO earnings management. By controlling the pre-IPO earning management in our regression models, we are able to achieve results that are free from potential effect from pre-IPO earnings management.
Univariate tests

[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The regression results in Table 5 According to Aharony et al. (2000) , in managing their earnings, Chinese firms typically manipulate accruals and profits from non-core operations. Therefore, to check the robustness of our results and to bring our accounting-based measures more in line with those of previous studies, we also use operating earnings/assets, operating earnings growth, and net operating income growth as accounting-based performance measures to test the relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and performance changes. As table 6 indicates, even using these alternative post-IPO accounting performance changes, the level of excess control rights remains negatively correlated with firms' accounting performance subsequent to the IPO. More specifically, firms whose ultimately controlling shareholders have more excess control rights experience a greater drop in operating earnings/assets and slower operating earnings growth and net income growth.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Taken together, the regression results in tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 suggest that non-state controlled firms in China that have issued IPOs generally show poorer stock returns and accounting performance when the ultimately controlling shareholders can exert 21 control through a pyramidal structure or cross-shareholding using control rights that are in excess of cash flow rights.
Disproportionate ownership structure and related party transactions
On the assumption that controlling shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders by tunneling the wealth of listed firms, we now explore whether a firm with disproportionate ownership structure is more likely to conduct tunneling activities.
Using related party transactions as proxies, we measure the effect of the wedges between control rights and cash flow rights on the probability of a firm undertaking tunneling transactions using the likelihood of a firm undertaking a value-destroying related party transaction as the dependent variable. Because there is no accurate measure of exactly how much benefit is transferred through these transactions, as in prior studies (Cheung et al., 2006 (Cheung et al., , 2009 
Robustness results
For robustness of our results, we also conduct the following tests: (1) we use the ratio of control rights and cash flow rights as new measure of excess control rights, and we find the positive relationship still hold between new measure of excess control rights and post-IPO performance; (2) we conduct separate regressions using different subsample of firms listed in main board, SME board and GEM board, and similar results are found indicating that the worse post-IPO performance in firms with excess control rights is not driven by the different risk profile of firms listed in different boards. The results of these robustness tests are not reported to save space.
Disproportionate ownership structure and initial IPO returns
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This section examines how the disproportionate ownership structure of non-state controlled IPO firms affects initial IPO returns (underpricing). Table 8 reports the mean and median market-adjusted initial stock returns for our sample, sorted by controlling shareholders' excess control rights and year. As the table shows, in most years, firms with a disproportionate ownership structure show smaller initial returns than firms without. The difference in mean of market-adjusted initial return of firms with and without disproportionate ownership structure is 9.16% (71.47% versus 80.63%, which is significant at the 10% level. These results support our hypothesis that the largest controlling shareholders' excess control rights have a negative impact on the initial returns of non-state controlled IPO firms.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
To distinguish the effect of a disproportionate ownership structure on the initial returns of non-state controlled firms, we also perform a regression analysis that controls for additional firm, industry, year, and institutional factors in China's IPO markets. The dependent variable in this model is the IPO's initial stock return, including both the unadjusted initial return (INITIAL RETURN) and the market-adjusted return (ADJ. INITIAL RETURN). Our key independent variables are the degree of the excess control rights (EXCESS) and a dummy (EXDUMMY) for the largest shareholders having excess control rights. The results are reported in panel A (initial return as dependent variable) and B (adjusted initial return as dependent variable) of Table 9 . As in panel A of Table 9 , when we include the key independents and only 24 control for year and industry factors, the estimated coefficients are significantly negative at the 5% level for the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge) and at the 1% level for the presence of largest shareholders' excess control rights (Ex_dummy).
We then run further regressions that include additional control variables suggested by prior research on IPO underpricing. Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) , for example, suggest that underpricing can be affected by the time gap between the offering and the listing. That is, because the information known by issuers, underwriters, and investors is asymmetrical (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986) , the longer the time lags between the offering and the listing, the higher the risk to investors and thus the greater the probability of underpricing. In fact, both Chan et al. (2004) and Su (2004) provide empirical evidence that IPO underpricing in China is positively related to the offering-to-listing time lag. To capture the effects of this information asymmetry, we include the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing dates (DAYLAG), together with other variables commonly used in related studies of Chinese IPOs (Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2004) , including the ultimately controlling shareholders' cash flow rights (CASHFLOW); the age of the firms(LNAGE), represented by the natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the company from the date on which it was first listed (with any part of a year treated as a whole year); the issue size (PROCEEDS), represented by the natural logarithm of the gross proceeds; the issuing P/E ratio and year, industry and listed dummies.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
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The results of these multiple regressions, shown in table 9, indicate that the time lag between the IPO date and the first trading date is insignificant in explaining IPO underpricing. Although this result contrasts with those of earlier studies (Mok and Hui, 1998; Su and Fleisher,1999; Chen et al.,2004) , it is consistent with more recent findings that the time lag in the Chinese IPO market has been dramatically shortened, thereby removing previously unknown factors caused by the long time lag (Yu and Tse, 2006 
Conclusions
Public investors invest in IPOs at capital markets because they believe in the issuing firms' future prospects, financial performance, and corporate governance. In China, the world's largest emerging economy, although the IPO market is actively attracting critical financing from retail investors, the long-run IPO performance is Regulators, for their part, must recognize that the current investor protection systems 27 need to address the challenge of protecting minority investors in corporations characterized by a complex and disproportionate ownership structure. The firms are sorted by whether or not the ultimately controlling shareholders have control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) and the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months starting from one month after the IPO month, both performances are adjusted by market, industry, and size. We calculate the CARs measure based on monthly market-adjust stock returns, and compute the market returns as the weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges. The accounting return measures are the average industry adjusted change in return on sales (ΔAROS), sales growth (ΔAGSALES), and earnings growth (ΔAGEARNS) in the three-year post-IPO period. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In this table, the dependent variable is market-based performance, measured as BHRs for 12, 24, and 36 months, starting from one month after the IPO month. The BHR measures are calculated based on monthly market, industry, and size-adjusted stock returns. As the BHRs may not be normally distributed, to alleviate the potential influence of non-normal distribution of the long-term performance of IPOs, we transform the equal weighted matching firm-adjusted three-year BHR to the natural logarithm of 1000% plus each BHR. Definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A.
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p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, the average industry adjusted change in return on sales (ΔAROS), sales growth (ΔAGSALES), and earnings growth (ΔAGEARNS) in the three-year post-IPO period. ΔSIZE, ΔLEVERAGE, and ΔP/E are the average industry adjusted change in firm size, leverage ratio and P/E ratio in the three-year post-IPO period. Excess control rights and cash flow rights are not change values because ownership structure are less likely to be changed during the 3 year lockup period. The number of observations in columns (2), (4) and (6) In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, the change in operating earnings/assets (ΔAOE/A), the operating earnings growth (ΔGAOE), and the net income growth (ΔGANOI) in the 3-year post-IPO period. ΔSIZE, ΔLEVERAGE, and ΔP/E are the average industry adjusted change in firm size, leverage ratio and P/E ratio in the three-year post-IPO period. Excess control rights and cash flow rights are not change values because ownership structure are less likely to be changed during the 3 year lockup period. The number of observations in columns (2), (4) and (6) In this regression model, the dependent variables are the unadjusted initial return (Initial Return) and the market-adjusted initial return (Market-adjusted Initial Return). AGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the company from the date on which it was first listed (with any part of a year treated as a whole year). PROCEED is the natural logarithm of the value of gross proceeds in the IPO. DAYLAG is the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing dates. Definitions of all other variables are detailed in Appendix A. P-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A Unadjusted initial return as dependent variable (1 
